By Hussain Awan*
This essay explores the following research question, analyzed first utilizing a response generated from ChatGPT, and then using the relevant scholarly material:
“What is ḥusn wa qubḥ, and how do the Sunni and Shī‘ī positions on natural law theory differ in light of ḥusn wa qubḥ?”
I. ChatGPT’s response
Ḥusn wa qubḥ (حسن وقبح) is a key theological and philosophical concept in Islamic thought, referring to the notions of moral goodness (ḥusn) and moral badness (qubḥ). At the heart of the debate is whether human reason (‘aql) can independently determine the moral value of actions, or if moral value is only established through divine revelation. This issue has been discussed extensively in both Sunni and Shī‘ī theology and has implications for their respective views on natural law theory.
1. Sunni vs. Shī‘ī positions on ḥusn wa qubḥ
A. Mu‘tazilite view (rationalist): morality as intrinsic
The Mu‘tazilites, an early rationalist school in Islamic theology, argued that moral values (goodness and badness) are intrinsic to actions. This means that human beings, through the use of their intellect (‘aql), can discern what is morally good or bad independently of divine revelation.
- Ḥusn wa Qubḥ Dhātī (Intrinsic Goodness and Badness): The Mu‘tazilites believed that justice, truthfulness, and other virtues are intrinsically good, while acts like lying or injustice are inherently bad. These moral qualities exist within the actions themselves, not merely because God commands or forbids them.
- Reason as a Source of Morality: For Mu‘tazilites, human reason can independently arrive at conclusions about what is morally right or wrong. This allows for a form of natural law in which humans, using their rational faculties, can recognize universal moral principles.
B. Ash‘arite view (divine command theory): morality is defined by God’s will
The Ash‘arites, who became the dominant theological school in Sunni Islam, rejected the Mu‘tazilite view of intrinsic morality and argued for a form of divine command theory:
- Ḥusn wa Qubḥ Shar‘ī (Legal or Command-based Goodness and Badness): According to the Ash‘arites, there is no inherent good or bad in actions. Instead, an action is good because God commands it and bad because God forbids it. Moral value is thus derived from divine revelation, not from the intrinsic nature of actions.
- Limited Role of Reason: Ash‘arites believed that human reason is not capable of independently determining moral truths. Only divine guidance (revelation) can definitively indicate what is good or bad. Therefore, Ash‘arites denied the possibility of natural law in the Mu‘tazilite sense, as morality is understood only through God’s will.
- Rejection of Natural Law: The Ash‘arite rejection of the possibility of independent moral reasoning implies a rejection of natural law. It leaves no room for a natural moral order discoverable by human reason alone, making the Ash‘arite position incompatible with classical natural law theory.
C. Shī‘ī Usūlī view (reason and revelation combined)
The Shī‘ī Usūlī school, the dominant school of thought in Shī‘ī Islam, aligns more closely with the Mu‘tazilite position in this debate. They believe that reason (‘aql) has a prominent role in discerning moral truths, though it operates within the framework of divine revelation.
- Reason (‘aql) as a Source of Moral Knowledge: Shī‘ī scholars argue that reason can independently recognize certain moral truths. For example, justice, honesty, and fairness are understood to be morally good, while injustice and lying are inherently bad. This view gives reason (‘aql) a significant role in the moral and legal reasoning process.
- Revelation and Reason in Tandem: In Shī‘ī thought, while reason is important, it does not operate in isolation. Revelation is still the ultimate guide, but the commands of God are seen to be in harmony with what is rationally discernible as morally good. God’s commands reflect inherent moral truths, rather than defining them arbitrarily.
- Natural Law in Shī‘ī Thought: Because reason (‘aql) is capable of discovering moral truths, there is a natural law-like element in Shī‘ī jurisprudence. Shī‘ī scholars accept that there are objective moral principles that reason can grasp, and these principles are often in alignment with divine revelation. This sets Shī‘ī thought apart from the Ash‘arite position, which denies independent rational moral inquiry.
II. Ḥusn wa qubḥ as explained in the scholarly literature
Just as in ChatGPT’s account, most scholarly discussions of natural law theory vis-à-vis modern Muslim sects begin by outlining the debate between the classical Mu‘tazilī and Ash‘arī positions on ḥusn wa qubḥ, as developed between the eighth and eleventh centuries.[1] Mu‘tazilīs such as ’Abū al-Hudhayl (d. 841), in seeking to prioritize Allah’s attribute of justice (‘adl)––an emphasis opposite to later Ash‘arīs’ focus on Allah’s attribute of omnipotence––concluded that human reason can arrive at a knowledge of moral goodness (ḥusn) and badness (qubḥ) without the presence of revelation.[2] They argued that moral rights and wrongs are objective and therefore not dependent on Allah having explicitly commanded them. While Mu‘tazilī scholars acknowledged the possible corrupt influences of phenomenon like human whims and desires (wahm) or social custom and pressure in a search for truth independent from divine text, they nevertheless contended that the human intellect alone could reason to general ethical obligations (such as prohibitions on lying, unjustified murder, etc.).[3] Religion, however, was generally acknowledged as necessary for the filling in of particular, discrete obligations (such as praying five times a day, conducting one’s ablution a certain way, etc.). Scholars have noted the parallels between Mu‘tazilī ḥusn wa qubḥ theory and classical Hellenistic natural law theory, in a period in which Islam was rapidly expanding across the Near East and Muslim scholars were coming into close contact with the writings of earlier intellectual traditions.[4]
In response to the rationalizing and pro-‘adl arguments of the Mu‘tazilīs, the Ash‘arī school emerged to become the forerunner of today’s Sunnī theological orthodoxy. Ash‘arīs focused on the notion that Allah’s omnipotence was not limited in any way, and so there did not exist any sort of external morality superadded on top of Allah’s decrees.[5] Ash‘arism embraced a sort of theological voluntarism. Hence, an action had moral goodness (ḥusn) if Allah commanded it and badness (qubḥ) if Allah forbade it.[6] The consequence of this was that Ash‘arīs even denied the Mu‘tazilī conclusion that generalized, abstract ethical principles (e.g., lying being immoral) could be deduced without reference to divine revelation. Put differently, Ash‘arīs were intensely skeptical of any attempt to argue that fallible, corruptible human ratiocination could access fundamental moral truths in the absence scripture.
The fault lines between the classical Mu‘tazilī and Ash‘arī positions on ḥusn wa qubḥ have largely been replicated by the modern-day Shī‘ī and Sunnī theology, with implications for these modern sects’ overlaps with theories of natural law and positivism. Shī‘ī theology quickly integrated and propagated Mu‘tazilī rationalist elements (even as Mu‘tazilism itself died out), particularly regarding reason’s ability to discern moral truths.[7] This adoption allowed Shī‘ī thought to retain an openness to natural law concepts, where reason operates in harmony with, rather than in opposition to, divine revelation. Shī‘ī scholars today maintain that certain moral truths, such as justice and fairness, can be discerned independently through reason, aligning them with a framework that acknowledges objective moral principles alongside revelation.[8] This is also why ‘aql, or the human intellect, forms one of the four sources of law in the Shī‘ī tradition but not the Sunnī one.
In contrast, the Ash‘arī position on ḥusn wa qubḥ came to achieve near-hegemonic status in Sunnī Islam.[9] This approach rejects the idea that moral values are intrinsic and discernible by reason alone, insisting instead that morality is solely defined by Allah’s will. This grounding in “divine command theory” aligns more closely with legal positivism (though in a “divine legal positivism” form––Allah is the legislator instead of a legislature), since the moral obligations arise exclusively from decrees rather than from universal, rationally discernible principles.
The following table summarizes the doctrinal positions described thus far:
| School | Ḥusn wa Qubḥ Position | Implications for the School’s Positions on Natural Law |
| Ash‘arī (Sunnī) | Divine Command Theory (Ḥusn wa Qubḥ Shar‘ī): Moral values are not intrinsic but defined by Allah’s commands. | Rejects Natural Law: Ash‘arīs assert that only Allah’s revelation determines morality, with no external intrinsic goodness or badness; similar to positivism. |
| Mu‘tazilī/Shī‘ī-Usūlī | Intrinsic Morality (Ḥusn wa Qubḥ Dhātī/‘Aqlī): Moral goodness and badness are intrinsic to actions, discernible by human reason (‘aql). | Affirms Natural Law: These groups argue that human reason can independently recognize universal moral principles without divine revelation, similar to ideas in classical natural law. |
III. Nuanced views of natural law in the Shī‘ī tradition
The dominant Shī‘ī position today, which corresponds to the old Mu‘tazilī stance, has been described above as ḥusn wa qubḥ dhātī (intrinsic goodness and badness) or ḥusn wa qubḥ ‘aqlī (rational goodness and badness).[10] In other words, the majority Shī‘ī position holds that intrinsic moral values can be discovered through pure reason, and are consequently timeless and independent of social and religious conventions.[11]
However, a different camp within the modern Shī‘ī tradition emphasizes the importance of adjudging moral goodness and badness according to sīrat al-ʿuqalāʾ (the practice of rational people––akin to a reasonableness standard in Western law).[12] Adherents of the ḥusn wa qubḥ ʿuqalāʾī (goodness and badness through rational consensus/reasonable goodness and badness) position maintain that the ‘aql-based inquiry into moral goodness and badness must take into account the consensus and practices of rational individuals and the potentially evolving collective reasoning of society.[13] For them, moral judgment is at least partly rooted in what rational people generally agree upon as moral or immoral, often via considerations of collective human wisdom and experience. This approach is less rigid than purely ‘aql-based morality and allows for some level of incorporation of socially contextual values.
The following table summarizes the doctrinal positions with the added nuance of different camps within the Shī‘ī school:
| School | Ḥusn wa Qubḥ Position | Implications for the School’s Positions on Natural Law |
| Ash‘arī (Sunnī) | Divine Command Theory (Ḥusn wa Qubḥ Shar‘ī): Moral values are not intrinsic but defined by Allah’s commands. | Rejects Natural Law: Ash‘arīs assert that only Allah’s revelation determines morality, with no external intrinsic goodness or badness; similar to positivism. |
| Mu‘tazilī/Shī‘ī-Usūlī [Majority] | Intrinsic Morality (Ḥusn wa Qubḥ Dhātī/‘Aqlī): Moral goodness and badness are intrinsic to actions, discernible by human reason (‘aql). | Affirms Natural Law: These groups argue that human reason can independently recognize universal moral principles without divine revelation, similar to ideas in classical natural law. |
| Shī‘ī-Usūlī [Minority] | Rational Consensus/Reasonableness Standard (Ḥusn wa Qubḥ ʿUqalāʾī): Moral goodness and badness are discerned through the ‘aql, but with consideration given to evolving social norms and the practices of rational/reasonable people (sīrat al-ʿuqalāʾ). | Partly in Tension with Natural Law: Adherents of this camp adapt ‘aql-based moral reasoning to society’s collective, reasonable judgments. This approach contradicts strong, pure reason-based formulations of natural law theory typically found in the West, but could be in consonance with a natural law theory that incorporates some degree of evolution and societal change. |
IV. Reflections on ChatGPT’s response
While I regularly try to incorporate ChatGPT into my workflow and so have a reasonable understanding of its case uses and limitations, even I was surprised by its competence at understanding the typology of Mu‘tazilī, Ash‘arī, and Shī‘ī-Usūlī positions on natural law and its alignment with the scholarly literature on these topics. It struck me that my query provided a great example of how ChatGPT can be particularly effective at outlining high-level distinctions between abstract scholarly positions, with a level of accuracy that the AI might not be able to replicate for specific case-by-case fiqh problems (as demonstrated by some of the other essay presentations in class so far).
- Strengths: Conceptual Clarity and Broad Overviews
ChatGPT excelled in presenting the key conceptual differences between the Mu‘tazilī, Ash‘arī, and Shī‘ī views on ḥusn wa qubḥ. It provided a clear summary of each theological stance. This conceptual clarity is particularly useful for understanding the general contours of each school’s beliefs, as long as you do not get into the arguments and counterarguments between the groups or the granularities of their positions. - Limitations: Depth and Specificity in Arguments
While ChatGPT’s response successfully identified the general categories, it lacked the depth present in the secondary scholarly literature, which articulated specific arguments and counterarguments that emerge from each of the above groups’ positions on ḥusn wa qubḥ. For instance, ChatGPT did not mention finer points made by scholars regarding objections to specific theological principles or implications. For example, Mu‘tazilī views on Allah’s attribute of justice are foundational to their argument for intrinsic moral values, whereas the Ash‘arī emphasis on omnipotence forms the core of their rebuttal. In particular, ChatGPT did not mention the important Ash‘arī counterarguments centered around a skepticism of the negative effects of whims and desires on human cognition. - Challenges with Case-Specific Jurisprudential Applications
ChatGPT’s summary was strong on theoretical distinctions, but it may not be able to be similarly accurate if it extends into specific fiqh case studies or discuss how the outlined theological views might impact practical legal rulings. A more nuanced understanding (or perhaps a future AI model) would benefit from examining how these positions on ḥusn wa qubḥ influence specific legal rulings, such as those related to justice, lying, or other ethical obligations.
Notes:
* Hussain Awan is a 3L and Teaching Fellow at Harvard Law School. He is a contributor to Harvard Law School’s Global Anticorruption Blog, a Harvard Law School Chayes Fellow, and a former clerk to Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah at the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Hussain attended McGill University in Montreal, where he studied International Development and French and graduated as class valedictorian.
[1] See, for example, Muḥammad Bāqir Ṣadr, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence, trans. Roy P. Mottahedeh (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 18–21; Jon McGinnis & Rahim Acar, “Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Religion,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, eds., Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/arabic-islamic-religion/.
[2] Ṣadr, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence, 19.
[3] McGinnis and Acar, “Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Religion.”
[4] See, for example, Anver M. Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 13–18.
[5] McGinnis and Acar, “Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Religion.”
[6] Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories, 27.
[7] Ṣadr, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence, 20–21.
[8] Mohsen Javadi, “Faith, Reason and Revealed Knowledge in the View of Shi’a Scholars,” Journal of Philosophy & Theological Research 21, no. 3 (2019).
[9] A. Heinen, “AŠʿARĪYA,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. II, Fasc. 7, 696–703, available at https://iranicaonline.org/articles/ashariya (accessed December 16, 2024).
[10] See Part II.
[11] See, for example, Ṣadr, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence 20–21.
[12] See, for example, Hamid Reza Maghsoodi, “The Role of ʿaql in the Thought of Mīrzā Mahdī Iṣfahānī” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 2019), 194 (discussing the importance of the concept of the ʿuqalāʾ in the thought of one influential scholar); Liyakat Takim, Shi‘ism Revisited, ch. 4, Reason and Ethics and an Islamic Reformation (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2022), 155, 173–74 (discussing how considerations of “ethical[] obnoxious[ness] to human reason (qubh- i ‘uqala’i)” can provide a framework for addressing controversial topics in Shī‘ī jurisprudence).
[13] See, for example, Maghsoodi, “The Role of ʿaql in the Thought of Mīrzā Mahdī Iṣfahānī.”
(Suggested Bluebook citation: Hussain Awan, Revelation, Reason, or Rational Consensus? Divergent Views on Ḥusn wa Qubḥ and Natural Law in Islam, Islamic Law Blog (Jan. 30, 2025), https://islamiclaw.blog/2025/01/30/revelation-reason-or-rational-consensus-divergent-views-on-%e1%b8%a5usn-wa-qub%e1%b8%a5-and-natural-law-in-islam/)
(Suggested Chicago citation: Hussain Awan, “Revelation, Reason, or Rational Consensus? Divergent Views on Ḥusn wa Qubḥ and Natural Law in Islam,” Islamic Law Blog, January 30, 2025, https://islamiclaw.blog/2025/01/30/revelation-reason-or-rational-consensus-divergent-views-on-%e1%b8%a5usn-wa-qub%e1%b8%a5-and-natural-law-in-islam/)