Editor’s Note: In the previous three essays of this series, Dominik Krell explored codification, muftis, and legal change in contemporary Saudi Arabia. In this final essay, Muhammad Zubair Abbasi takes up these themes in a comparative context.
Introduction
The Personal Status Law of 2022 (PSL) forms part of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 reform agenda.[1] The PSL codifies legal rules governing family relations, including marriage, divorce, child custody, maintenance, gifts, wills, and inheritance. While drawing extensively on principles derived from classical fiqh, the PSL introduces substantive reforms by codifying, clarifying, and standardizing rules that were previously applied through judicial discretion.
The law sets the minimum age of marriage at eighteen, while permitting courts to authorize the marriage of individuals under eighteen where they are deemed sufficiently mature to provide consent.[2] It further enhances women’s autonomy in marriage by limiting the traditional authority of the guardian: a judge may intervene to permit a woman to marry a man of her choice where the guardian’s objection is deemed unreasonable.[3] The PSL strengthens women’s rights within marriage by invalidating the practice of instant divorce (triple ṭalāq)[4] and broadening women’s access to no-fault dissolution through a judicially supervised reconciliation process.[5] It also reinforces married women’s financial rights by requiring husbands to provide maintenance irrespective of the wife’s financial standing.[6] In addition, the financial burden associated with wife-initiated no-fault divorce (khulʿ) is curtailed by limiting the compensation payable to the husband to prompt dower.[7]
The above are significant legal developments and their impact is likely to go beyond the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In this essay, I assess the impact of PSL on judicial khulʿ in Pakistan.
Codification of Islamic Family Law: Saudi Arabia’s Personal Status Law 2022
A central reform under the PSL is the expansion of wives’ rights to dissolve marriage without their husbands’ consent. This is undertaken through a judicially supervised mediation mechanism[8] through which women may obtain a no-fault dissolution of marriage without proving misconduct by their husbands. Notably, the PSL retains the classical fiqh requirement for the consent of the husband to khulʿ under Article 95, which provides, “Khulʿ means separation of spouses at the request of the wife and with the consent of the husband in return for compensation paid by the wife or a third party.”[9] The law dispenses with the husband’s consent to khulʿ, however, in two circumstances. First, if the mediators fail to reconcile the differences between the spouses and decide to dissolve their marriage with or without compensation;[10] and second, when the wife seeks khulʿ prior to consummation or khalwa (valid seclusion in which consummation would have been possible).[11]
In khulʿ cases, compensation is capped at paid dower,[12] and children’s rights or custody cannot be waived as consideration.[13] Moreover, a wife would only be required to return the dower to the husband if her “request to dissolve the marriage contract prior to consummation or khalwa is for a reason attributable to her.”[14]
While retaining the requirement of the husband’s consent for khulʿ as provided under classical fiqh, the PSL has reformed this law through procedural rules that authorize mediators to dispense with the husband’s consent and dissolve the marriage when the relationship has irretrievably broken down.[15]
In substance, the Saudi law on khulʿ expanded women’s rights to divorce within the framework of classical fiqh and without provoking controversies and criticism from traditionalist jurists. Dominik Krell has traced the roots of this law reform to the opinion of prominent Saudi scholar Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm (d. 1969), who cited Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) in support of his view that a judge may compel a husband to give his consent for khulʿ.[16] Another prominent Saudi scholar, Ibn ʿUthaymīn (d. 2001), also permitted judges to compel a husband to consent to khulʿ.[17] In addition to citing Ibn Taymiyya’s opinion, Ibn ʿUthaymīn argued that a judge’s obligation is to resolve the dispute between the spouses, and if the wife does not want to remain with her husband and the husband insists on keeping the marriage intact, the only way left for the judge to resolve the conflict is by dissolving the marriage.[18] Other Saudi scholars, such as Ibn Khunayn (b. 1956), argued that an unhappy marriage constituted harm to the wife and, according to the legal canon of Islamic jurisprudence that no harm shall be inflicted or reciprocated (lā ḍarar wa-lā ḍirār).[19] This view is reflected in a 2013 decision in which a judge noted that an unhappy marriage violated the wife’s dignity (karāma).[20] Ibn Khunayn also emphasised the procedural aspects of “forced khulʿ” as a mechanism to resolve disputes between the spouses.[21]
The following section examines how Pakistani ʿulamāʾ responded to the “judicial khulʿ,” under which courts removed the requirement of the husband’s consent for wife-initiated divorce (khulʿ). It compares their position with that of Saudi jurists on the parallel debate over “forced khulʿ.”
Judicial Khulʿ in Pakistan: Judicial Itjihād and ʿUlamāʾ Opposition
The judicial discourse on khulʿ in Pakistan started in late 1950s. In an influential 1959 judgment of the Lahore High Court, Justice BZ Kaikaus cited the legal canon “Let no harm be done, nor harm be suffered in Islam” in support of his view that a husband’s consent is not required for khulʿ and that a judge has the authority to dissolve a marriage if the wife initiates khulʿ while her husband withholds his consent.[22] Justice Kaikaus observed that Islam does not force upon the spouses a life devoid of harmony and happiness, and if the parties cannot live together, their marriage must be dissolved.[23] Several decades later, when the validity of “judicial khulʿ” was contested before Pakistan’s Federal Shariat Court, Justice Fida Muhammad held, “Islam does not intend to force a wife to live a miserable life, in a hateful unhappy union, forever. If she is unhappy and reconciliation fails, she should be entitled to get relief whatsoever. This is what justice demands.”[24]
Justice Kaikaus also recommended the judicial procedure of appointing arbiters, the same procedure adopted under the PSL Articles 109–11.[25] Regarding the return of dower by the wife, Justice Kaikaus held that if the dissolution is due to some default on the part of the husband, there is no need for any restoration. If the husband is not at fault, the wife may have to return her dower, but the judge may take into consideration reciprocal benefits received by the husband, and continuous cohabitation may also constitute a benefit received.[26] Similarly, Ibn Khunayn stated that the amount of compensation depended on the spouses’ fault in the divorce. If neither spouse could be found responsible for the divorce, the wife only had to pay back half of what she had received from the husband. If the judge concluded that the husband had caused the divorce, the wife did not have to return any assets.[27]
Yet despite similarities between the Saudi “forced khulʿ” and Pakistani “judicial khulʿ,” Pakistani ʿulamāʾ oppose the latter. As part of my research on the practice of Islamic divorce law in Pakistan, I sought legal opinions (fatāwā) from the leading dār al-iftāʾ (fatwā institutions) in Pakistan on whether judicial khulʿ without the consent of the husband accords with sharīʿa.[28] I received nine responses representing various schools of thought. Except for the fatwā of a Salafī institution representative of the ahl al-ḥadīth school, the responses from other institutions stated that judicial khulʿ without the husband’s consent is invalid.[29]
According to them, judicial khulʿ can only be granted if the husband agrees to it because, according to the Qur’an and sunna (traditions of Prophet Muhammad), only the husband has the right to divorce. Furthermore, they argue that khulʿ is a transaction based on the mutual consent of spouses and that neither party can be forced into it. Mufti Taqi Usmani, who served as a judge of the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court for more than two decades, is the leading proponent of this view.[30] Several contemporary ʿulamāʾ of the Deobandi school follow this opinion.[31]
Although most contemporary Pakistaniʿulamāʾ support the prohibitive view regarding judicial khulʿ, this does not mean that they disregard the existing substantive and procedural laws of divorce in Pakistan. In fact, most ʿulamāʾ do not oppose the formal state law on khulʿ.[32] Even Mufti Usmani, the most prominent proponent of this view, in one fatwā advised the husband to accept his wife’s claim for khulʿ where the parties had been litigating for a long time.[33] In another fatwā, he expressed the view that a judge may dissolve a marriage on behalf of the husband who refused to give his consent for khulʿ and further failed to provide maintenance to the wife.[34] These early fatāwā differ from his views expressed in his widely circulated article on this topic wherein he reiterates the classical position of the Ḥanafī school emphasizing the requirement of the husband’s consent.[35]
An analysis of the views of Ḥanafī jurists shows that they oppose judicial khulʿ without the consent of the husband primarily because of its doctrinal incompatibility with the views of classical jurists. In practice, they accept the validity of judicial decrees; their only objection is that judges should not use the incorrect term “khulʿ” but rather should use the correct term “faskh” when they issue decrees for the dissolution of marriage.[36] Maulana Sherani expressed a similar view while acting as the Chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology, suggesting that the judicial practice of granting khulʿ without the husband’s consent is not in accordance with sharīʿa and proposing that judges should distinguish between khulʿ and faskh while issuing decrees of dissolution of marriage.[37]
Conclusion
The codification of the Islamic dissolution of marriage law in the PSL helps clarify the confusion in Pakistani law, which has developed primarily through judicial decisions over several decades, often without coherence or consistency.[38] The criticism of traditional ʿulamāʾ may be addressed by clarifying that both the Saudi “forced khulʿ” and Pakistani “judicial khulʿ” are distinct from the traditional consent-based khulʿ, which requires no judicial intervention. After all, if a husband agrees to a wife-initiated khulʿ, there is no reason for the wife to approach a court unless the dispute concerns financial matters. Where a wife seeks dissolution on either fault-based grounds or on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, a judge has the authority to resolve the dispute independently or through reconciliation by arbiters, as contemplated by Qur’ānic verses 4:35 and 2:229. In doing so, the judge adjudicates the dispute between the spouses without being constrained by the technical distinctions between the various forms of dissolution of marriage — distinctions that bear primarily on financial remedies, namely whether full dower, partial dower, or no dower is to be returned. Rather than treating khulʿ in isolation and anchoring juristic discourse on the requirement of the husband’s consent for its validity, a wife’s petition must be understood within the broader framework of dispute resolution and the administration of justice. This is precisely what the PSL has achieved by streamlining the procedural framework for dissolution of marriage.
As the Indian Supreme Court is in the process of issuing its judgment on an important khulʿ case,[39] it is worth considering the relevant provisions of the PSL to expand women’s right to dissolution of marriage within the framework of classical fiqh. The Saudi experience offers important lessons for South Asian policymakers and jurists. By codifying procedures that draw on established classical opinions while systematizing access to divorce, the PSL illustrates that legal reform can simultaneously enhance women’s rights and maintain doctrinal coherence.
Notes:
[1] “Vision 2030,” Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accessed March 16, 2026, https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/media/cofh1nmf/vision-2030-overview.pdf.
[2] Personal Status Law of 2022 [PSL] art. 9 (Saudi Arabia).
[3] PSL art. 20.
[4] PSL art. 83
[5] PSL arts. 109–11.
[6] PSL art. 44.
[7] PSL art. 101. Dower under Islamic law is divided into two types. Prompt dower is a sum of money or property that a husband is obliged to pay his wife immediately upon marriage. Deferred dower, by contrast, falls due only upon dissolution of the marriage, whether by divorce or the husband’s death.
[8] PSL art.s 109–11.
[9] PSL art. 95.
[10] PSL art. 111.
[11] The PSL also broadens fault-based grounds (faskh). A wife may seek dissolution for non-payment of dower prior to consummation, failure of maintenance, refusal to fulfill marital obligations or unjustified absence exceeding four months (arts. 113–14), or the husband’s disappearance for one year (art. 115). Reducing the waiting period for a missing husband to one year marks a significant departure from classical fiqh, which could extend the period to the presumed maximum human lifespan of ninety years according to the Ḥanafī school or to four years according to the Ḥanbalī school.
[12] PSL art. 99.
[13] PSL art 100.
[14] PSL art 112(2).
[15] The PSL is supplemented with new procedural rules introduced in February 2025. “Saudi Arabia implements new personal status regulations.” Zawya, February 24, 2025.
[16] Dominik Krell, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia (Brill, 2025), 163.
[17] Krell, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia, 163–64.
[18] Krell, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia, 163–64.
[19] Krell, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia, 164–65.
[20] Krell, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia, 168. Riyadh General Court, decision No. 3460936 (confirmed by the Riyadh Court of Appeal on May 28, 2013/Rajab 18, 1434).
[21] Krell, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia, 165.
[22] Balqis Fatima v. Najmul Ikram (1959) PLD (Lahore) 566 at [17] (Pak.).
[23] Najmul Ikram, PLD at [24].
[24] Saleem Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan (2014) PLD (FSC) 43, 53 (Pak.).
[25] Najmul Ikram, PLD at [40] (Pak.).
[26] Najmul Ikram, PLD at [24].
[27] Krell, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia, 168; ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad Āl Khunayn, al-Khulʿ bi-Ṭalab al-Zawja (Dār Ibn Farḥūn, 1421/2001), 166.
[28] For details see, Muhammad Zubair Abbasi, “Development of Women’s Right to No-fault Judicial Divorce (Khulʿ) in Pakistan,” Islamic Studies 61, no. 2 (2022): 169–89.
[29] A fatwā issued by Markaz al-Daʿwat al-Salafiyya Satiana, Faisalabad, dated December 21, 2015 (on file with the author).
[30] Mufti Taqi Usmani, Islām Mein Khulʿ ki Ḥaqīqat [The Reality of Khulʿ in Islam] (Maiman Islamic Publishers, n.d), 18, first published in Fiqhī Maqālāt (Maiman Publishers, 1996), 137–94.
[31] Fatāwā issued by Jāmiʿa al-ʿUlūm al-Islāmiyya, Banuri Town, Karachi dated December 28, 2016; Jāmiʿat al-Rashīd, Karachi, dated January 9, 2017; Jāmiʿa Naʿīmiyya, Lahore, dated December 15, 2016; and Dār al-ʿUlūm Ḥaqqāniyya Akhora Khattak, Noshera, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, dated September 14, 2014.
[32] On the question of the validity of judicial khulʿ, the fatwā issued by the prominent Deobandi institution Dār al-Iftāʾ of Akhora Khattak specified on the front page that “this fatwā is not for use in the court.” A fatwā issued by Ghulam Hussain of Jāmiʿa Dar al-ʿUlūm Ḥaqqāniyya, Akhora Khattak, Noshera, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, dated September 14, 2014 (on file with the author). This is because, according to Ḥanafī jurists, a judge has the authority to decide according to the views of jurists belonging to other schools, which also removes juristic differences (al-rafʿ al-nizāʿ). An order of a ruler (imām) performs a similar function, which means that legislation based on the views of jurists of a particular school removes juristic differences of opinion. MM Zahid, “ʿAdaltī tansīkh e nikāh kā sharaʿī hukm” [The Islamic Legal Status of Judicial Dissolution of Marriage], Fikr o nazar 30, no. 3 (2002): 3.
[33] Fatwā number 2526/27H dated November 2, 1976 in Mufti Taqi Usmani, Fatāwā Usmānī, (Maktabat Maʿārif al-Qurʾān, 2006), 2:445.
[34] Fatwā number 126/19A dated May 23, 1968; Usmani, Fatāwā, 2:461.
[35] Usmani, Islām Mein Khulʿ ki Ḥaqīqat, 137–94.
[36] This view is reflected in the fatwā issued by Jāmi‘a al-Rashīd.
[37] Council of Islamic Ideology, “Session No. 199,” May 27–28, 2015, http://cii.gov.pk/announcements/Dissolution.pdf.
[38] For details see MZ Abbasi, “From Faskh to Khula: Transformation of Muslim Women’s Right to Divorce in Pakistan (1947-2017),” Asian Yearbook of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 3 (2019): 331–56.
[39] X v Y SLP (Civil) 8936-8937/2024 (Supreme Court of India). The case is listed for hearing on April 22, 2026. See “Record of Proceedings,” accessed April 3, 2026, https://lawbeat.in/pdf_upload/x-vs-y-2127072.pdf .
Suggested Bluebook citation: Muhammad Zubair Abbasi, Expanding Muslim Women’s Right to Divorce: Judicial Khulʿ in Saudi Arabia’s Personal Status Law and Muslim Personal Law in South Asia, Islamic L. Blog (Apr. 30, 2026), https://islamiclaw.blog/2026/04/30/expanding-muslim-womens-right-to-divorce-judicial-khul%ca%bf-in-saudi-arabias-personal-status-law-and-muslim-personal-law-in-south-asia/.
Suggested Chicago citation: Muhammad Zubair Abbasi, “Expanding Muslim Women’s Right to Divorce: Judicial Khulʿ in Saudi Arabia’s Personal Status Law and Muslim Personal Law in South Asia,” Islamic Law Blog, April 30, 2026, https://islamiclaw.blog/2026/04/30/expanding-muslim-womens-right-to-divorce-judicial-khul%ca%bf-in-saudi-arabias-personal-status-law-and-muslim-personal-law-in-south-asia/.