| Title | Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 __ (1949): Religiously Inflammatory Speech Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1949] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: A “breach of the peace” ordinance unconstitutionally infringed upon the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Free speech can be restricted only in the event it produces a clear and present danger beyond public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Reversed, 5-4, in an opinion by Justice Douglas on May 16, 1949. Chief Justice Vinson, Justice Frankfurter, and Justice Jackson all filed separate dissenting opinions. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | Facts: Petitioner (Father Arthur Terminiello) gave a speech in a Chicago auditorium where he criticized various political and racial groups and condemned the crowd of protestors that had gathered outside. Chicago policemen were unable to prevent disturbances by the angry crowd gathered outside to protest the speech, and arrested Terminiello for breaching the peace in violation of a city ordinance. Terminiello was convicted in state court for violating a city ordinance forbidding any breach of the peace. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter invoked kadijustiz as a convenient way for judges to cite foreign law in order to contest one set of values without being specific about the reasons for his own value preferences. |
| References | Sources: Oyez Case Brief; SCOTUSblog Monday round-up |
| Source Name | Justia |
| Source URL | https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/337/1/ |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) [Justice Douglas (author), Justice Reed, Justice Murphy, Justice Rutledge, Justice Burton; Dissenting: Chief Justice Vinson, Justice Frankfurter, and Justice Jackson] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; first amendment; 1st Amendment; free speech |
| Title | Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986): Sidewalk Protesting Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1986] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: Closing a public sidewalk during a gay pride parade violates the right to freedom of speech for demonstrators. However, a reasonable time, manner, and place restriction can be placed on the activities of all demonstrators. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Affirmed in part and reversed in part in an opinion authored by Judge Cardamone and joined by Judges Newsman and Pierce. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | Plaintiffs (gay rights activists) decided to conduct a peaceful demonstration on a public sidewalk in front of St. Patrick’s Cathedral during a gay pride parade. The defendants (New York city officials and the police department) decided to close the sidewalk to all demonstrators during the parade. The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging an infringement of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. The plaintiffs prevailed in District Court, which issued a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from closing the sidewalk because the decision to prohibit access to the sidewalk violated plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment. The defendants appealed, and the Court affirmed the judgment declaring violations of the plaintiffs’ civil rights, but held that the District Court erred because the injunction did not protect the constitutional rights of counter-demonstrators. |
| References | |
| Source Name | Justia |
| Source URL | http://openjurist.org/801/f2d/602/olivieri-v-ward-i |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986) [Judge Cardamone (author), Judge Newsman, Judge Pierce] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz |
| Title | Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000): Pension Plan Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 2000] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: By failing to perform their fiduciary duties under ERISA to protect a former spouse’s rights and interests as an alternate payee following a divorce, defendant-trustees afforded a plaintiff standing to bring a claim against the trustees. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Reversed and remanded, in an opinion by Judge Pregerson and joined by Judge Noonan. Judge O’Scannlain wrote a dissenting opinion. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | When the plaintiff (Shirley Stewart) divorced her husband Richard Nielson in 1989, a California court issued a Marital Dissolution Order, which, inter alia, awarded Ms. Stewart a community property share in Mr. Nielson’s interest in an ERISA profit-sharing pension plan. Despite Ms. Stewart’s right to receive her community property share in Mr. Nielsen’s interest in the ERISA plan, the defendants (Thorpe Holding Company, the ERISA Plan of Thorpe Holding Company, and one of the four trustees of the ERISA plan with fiduciary responsibility for its administration) failed to distribute the funds to Stewart. Instead, Mr. Nielsen received the entire interest in the ERISA plan. Ms. Stewart brought an action seeking her share of Nielsen’s interest in the ERISA claim. The District Court granted summary judgment for defendants, ruling that Ms. Stewart lacked standing to bring her ERISA claim because her Marital Dissolution Order purportedly did not satisfy some of the requirements of a “Qualified Domestic Relations Order” under ERISA.
In the opinion, Judge Pregerson used Justice Frankfurter’s image of a capricious qadi, used in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), to contest his colleague’s conclusion that a “sympathetic plaintiff” had standing to sue on what he regarded as equitable grounds in contravention of the plain meaning of the applicable statute. |
| References | |
| Source Name | Google Scholar |
| Source URL | https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10842573974155320498 |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) [Judge Pregerson (author), Judge Noonan; Dissenting: Judge O’Scannlain] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; ERISA |
| Title | Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996): Assisted Suicide Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1996] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: A Washington statute prohibiting physicians from prescribing life-ending medication for use by terminally ill adults violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
| Judgment | Judgment: The request to rehear this case was rejected by 11 judges: Chief Judge Hug, and Judges Browning, Schroeder, Fletcher, Pregerson, Reinhardt, Beezer, Wiggings, Thompson, and Fernandez. Judge O’Scannlain and Judge Trott dissented. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The plaintiffs asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees adults who are mentally competent, terminally ill, and acting under no undue influence the right to voluntarily hasten their death by taking a lethal dose of physician-prescribed drugs. The plaintiffs therefore challenged the constitutionality of the Natural Death Act, Revised Code of Washington 9 A. 36.060, which makes it a felony to knowingly aid another person in committing suicide. The plaintiffs challenged the statute only insofar as it bans physician-assisted suicide by mentally competent, terminally ill adults who knowingly and voluntarily choose to hasten their death. The State of Washington appealed the decision of the District Court, holding unconstitutional Washington’s statute on promoting a suicide attempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. A request to have the case reheard before the full Court was rejected.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge O’Scannlain invoked kadijustiz to object to the arbitrariness of the majority of the Ninth Circuit’s en banc court for recognizing a right that had failed in a Washington state-wide referendum. Judge O’Scannlain argued that, instead of dispensing justice like the ancient Muslim official “under a tree,” in the absence of a clear constitutional standard or violation, states, rather than the federal government, should decide on the legality of physician-assisted suicide. |
| References | |
| Source Name | Google Scholar |
| Source URL | https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12108487166662966933 |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996) [Chief Judge Hug (author), Judges Browning, Schroeder, Fletcher, Pregerson, Reinhardt, Beezer, Wiggings, Thompson, and Fernandez; Dissenting: Judge O’Scannlain and Judge Trott] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; physician-assisted suicide |
| Title | Harris v. Reeves, 946 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1991): Intervenor Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1991] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: A district attorney intervenor’s right to seek equitable relief does not change her role or interest in the litigation. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Greenberg and joined by Judge Stapleton. Judge Aldisert filed a dissenting opinion. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | Facts: Plaintiffs (ten prison inmates in Philadelphia’s Holmesburg Prison) filed suit against the defendants (city and state officials), claiming that their prison conditions were unconstitutional. The parties entered into a consent decree, and the intervenor district attorney filed a motion to intervene as of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) or for permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). A new consent decree was entered as a result of intervenor’s actions. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the motion, and the court affirmed. The intervenor filed a second motion subsequent to the enactment of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §1108, outlining the district attorneys’ standing and interest in prisoner litigation. The District Court again denied her motion, and intervenor sought review. Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss intervenor’s appeal. The Appeals Court granted the motion and dismissed the intervenor’s appeal because the notice provisions of § 1108 did not give the intervenor a substantial enough interest in plaintiffs’ action.
Judge Aldisert, like Justice Frankfurter in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) before him, invoked kadijustiz in his dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority opinion failed to recognize the unambiguous letter of a state statute, and therefore acted like an “ancient Moslem magistrate who dispensed justice under a palm tree, beholden to no authority but the dictates of his own will.” |
| References | |
| Source Name | Google Scholar |
| Source URL | https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17583435370287377092 |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Harris v. Reeves, 946 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1991) [Judge Greenberg (author), Judge Stapleton; Dissenting: Judge Aldisert] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; equitable relief; intervenor |
| Title | United States v. Murray, 621 F.2d 1163 (1st Cir. 1980): Glue Purchasing Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1980] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: In order to ascertain the “country of origin” for a tariff rate for a good that transfers borders, there must be a “substantial transformation” – that is, a fundamental change in the form, appearance, nature, or character of an article which adds to the value of the article an amount or percentage which is significant in comparison with the value which the article had when exported from the country in which it was first manufactured, produced, or grown. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Wyzanski, joined by Chief Judge Coffin and Judge Bownes. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The defendant, John Murray, Jr., arranged to have glue purchased in China shipped to Holland and repackaged and resold to defendant’s company in order to obtain a more favorable tariff. The defendant, who stated that the glue originated in Holland, was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.S. § 371, criminalizing the intent to defraud the United States, for conspiring to defraud the United States, and 18 U.S.C.S. § 542, criminalizing the entry of goods by making false statements, for making false statements in bringing merchandise. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions. The defendant appealed the District Court’s decision.
In the opinion, Judge Wyzanski invoked kadijustiz to argue that the Court had no obligation to defer or give much weight to administrative rulings by Customs agents which are not supported by reasoning, which are “unprincipled,” like “decisions by a Kadi at the gate.” |
| References | |
| Source Name | Google Scholar |
| Source URL | https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4611220582977944739 |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | United States v. Murray, 621 F.2d 1163 (1st Cir. 1980) [Judge Wyzanski (author), Chief Judge Coffin, Judge Bownes] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz |
| Title | Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 396 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1968): “Oil and Gas Lease Case” |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1968] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: The limited scope of Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce arbitration judgments, on the grounds that “the grounds for vacating an arbitration award are exceedingly few.” |
| Judgment | Judgment: Affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, joined by Judges Waterman and Kaufman. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The appellant (Illinois Central Railroad Company) and appellee (Boston and Maine Corporation) were involved in a controversy over the collection of interline freight balances and appellant’s claims for per diem freight car rentals. Although the parties agreed to await the decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission to resolve this controversy, the appellee invoked the mandatory arbitration rules to recover monies from the appellant. The appellant participated in the arbitration, but contested its propriety. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Boston and Maine Corporation summary judgment against Illinois Central Railroad Company to enforce the awards of the arbitrators under the mandatory arbitration rules of the Association of American Railroads. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that, once the parties made an arbitration agreement valid under the Federal Arbitration Act, the grounds for vacating an award were exceedingly few, and none of the exceptions applied in this case.
In the opinion, Judge Friendly pointed out that deference was due to an arbitrator even though he disagreed with the equities of an arbitration award, and invoked the theme of kadijustiz to suggest that only appeals to equity rather than law would allow him to decide differently: “[I]f we were dispensing Cadi justice, we would be disposed to rule in defendant’s favor. However, the limited scope of judicial review under the Federal Arbitration Act forbids our doing so….” |
| References | |
| Source Name | Google Scholar |
| Source URL | https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15798878192137217506 |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 396 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1968) [Judge Friendly (author), Judge Waterman, Judge Kaufman] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; arbitration |
| Title | Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1984): Employee Arbitration Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1984] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: An arbitrator’s award under a collective bargaining agreement is valid provided it is an attempt to interpret the collective bargaining agreement, rather than to apply the arbitrator’s own ideas of right or wrong. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in an opinion by Judge Posner, joined by Judges Flaum and Nichols. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | Facts: The appellant, Miller Brewer Company, initiated an action against the appellee, Local 9 of the Brewery Workers Union, under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 185, which provides that a labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and on behalf of or by employees, to set aside an arbitrator’s award that found the appellant had violated a collective bargaining agreement. The case arose after one member of a multi-employer unit withdrew from the unit and shut down one of its breweries. After the appellant recalled temporary employees, an employee from the shut-down brewery filed a grievance alleging that the appellant was required by a hiring-preference clause in the multi-employer agreement to give him preference over temporary employees. An arbitrator ordered the appellant to hire the employee. The District Court granted enforcement of an arbitrator’s order to hire one of the appellee’s employees. The appellant sought review of this decision.
The Second Circuit Court supported the arbitration award because it was satisfied that the arbitrator was not guilty of issuing an award on the basis of his own conception of the equities – invoking kadijustiz to mean a lack of reasonableness. That is, the Court was satisfied that the arbitrator’s award was grounded in some rational basis. |
| References | |
| Source Name | Google Scholar |
| Source URL | https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15798878192137217506 |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1984) [Judge Posner (author), Judge Flaum, Judge Nichols] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; arbitration |
| Title | Hillcrest Foods, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local Union No. 576, 753 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Kan. 1990): Meat Cutter Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1990] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: An arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract; but if the parties have authorized an arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the agreement, the Court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract.
|
| Judgment | Judgment: Judge Rogers denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and directed the plaintiff to pay the arbitration award. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The plaintiff, Hillcrest Foods, sold two grocery stores and fired the defendants, three meat cutters represented by the Local Union No. 576, following the sale. Meat cutters with less seniority than the terminated workers were retained by the plaintiff at the remaining grocery store that continued to operate after the sale. The meat cutters filed a grievance, arguing that, according to the collective bargaining agreement, meat cutters with the most seniority should have been retained by the plaintiff. The case was first referred to arbitration, and the arbitrator found that the employment agreement did not include separate seniority postings for individual stores. Because Hillcrest Foods did not retain the appropriate employees as determined by the contract, Hillcrest Food was found to have violated the employment agreement. Following arbitration, Hillcrest Food filed suit seeking to set aside the arbitration award. The defendants counterclaimed requesting an order to compel compliance with the arbitration award.
The Court supported the arbitration award because it was satisfied that the arbitrator was not guilty of issuing an award on the basis of his own conception of the equities – invoking kadijustiz to mean a lack of reasonableness. That is, the Court was satisfied that the arbitrator’s award was grounded in some rational basis. |
| References | |
| Source Name | Google Scholar |
| Source URL | https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13149552404800977565 |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Hillcrest Foods, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local Union No. 576, 753 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Kan. 1990) [Judge Rogers (author)] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; arbitration |
| Title | United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966): Mental Capacity Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1990] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: The better test for mental incapacity is set forth in the Model Penal Code § 4.01, stipulating that a defendant cannot not be held accountable for criminal activity if he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of an act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Reversed and remanded, in an opinion by Judge Kaufman, joined by Judge Hays. Judge Waterman wrote a concurring opinion. On remand, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that the District Court evaluate the appellant’s mental capacity in conformity with Model Penal Code § 4.01. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | Appellant Charles Freeman made a heroin sale to an undercover police officer. During his trial, medical experts differed as to whether the appellant was so mentally incompetent that he could not be held accountable for his criminal activity. The appellant had a long history of illegal drug usage and alcohol consumption. The District Court limited the inquiry into mental capacity to the M’Naghten Rule to determine whether appellant was capable of knowing right from wrong. The appellant challenged his conviction in the District Court on two counts of selling narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C.S. § 173. The appellant alleged that he lacked sufficient mental capacity to be held responsible for the criminality of his act.
The opinion used the notion of kadijustiz to argue that it could validly deny the M’Naghten test in favor of the Model Penal Code standard for mental capacity because the Supreme Court had not spoken definitely on the issue. |
| References | |
| Source Name | Justia |
| Source URL | http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/357/606/38627/ |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966) [Judge Kaufman (author), Judge Hays, Dissenting: Judge Waterman] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; mental capacity; competence |
| Title | Colonial Trust Co. v. Goggin, 230 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1955): Aircraft Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1955] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: A bankruptcy referee may not be afforded total deference, and instead must base decisions in applicable state or federal law. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Reversed, in an opinion by Judge Fee, joined by Judges Chambers and Taylor, requiring that the aircraft be turned over to appellant upon payment of the required amount. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | Intercontinental Airways, Inc., filed a petition under Chapter XI, 11 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. Appellee George Goggin, by consideration of the Bankruptcy Court, was appointed Trustee of the estate in a bankruptcy proceeding for pending administration. In the proceeding, Appellant Colonial Trust Company filed a petition for reclamation of a C-46 aircraft, which then in possession of the Trustee as a part of the assets of this estate. Colonial Trust Company leased to American Airways, Inc., by written agreement, this C-46 aircraft on August 30, 1951. Colonial Trust Company had no dealings with Intercontinental Airways, Inc., but at the request of Air America, U.S. Airlines, and various individuals, took the aircraft into its possession and performed work on the aircraft in Los Angeles County, State of California, for which it claims a lien. Intercontinental knew that Colonial Trust was the owner of the aircraft, but made no attempt to secure written or oral consent of that company for the work or the lien and did not notify Colonial Trust of the contemplated work. Goggin, as Trustee, took possession of the aircraft. Colonial Trust Company sought review from a district court judgment affirming the denial of its petition for reclamation of an aircraft in the possession of appellee bankruptcy trustee in a Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.S. § 701 et seq., proceeding, arguing that it was entitled to reclamation.
The court used the notion of kadijustiz to justify its rejection of the bankruptcy referee’s decision, which ignored the state statute, on the grounds that the plaintiff had no “intention . . . that the adjudication of its title and right to possession should proceed upon such abstract theory of justice which might be entertained by an oriental cadi.” |
| References | |
| Source Name | Justia |
| Source URL | http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/230/634/232317/ |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Colonial Trust Co. v. Goggin, 230 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1955) [Judge Fee (author), Judge Chambers, Judge Taylor] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; bankruptcy |
| Title | New Alliance Party v. Dinkins, 743 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1990): Political Rally Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1990] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: Although insuring the safety of public officials and their families constitute a significant and compelling interest, the actions of a police department must be narrowly tailored to address this government interest, or they will unjustifiably curtail the First Amendment right to protest. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Granting a preliminary injunction in part and denying it in part, in an opinion by Judge Leisure. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The plaintiffs, the New Alliance Party, sought to hold a political rally to the immediate south of the mayor’s residence in New York and just outside the walls of its enclave or at the front gates of that residence. The permit was denied by the Parks Department after consulting with the Police Department. The plaintiffs, its chairperson, and residents, filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief and requested a preliminary finding that the actions of the defendants (Mayor David Dinkins, the city, its department of parks and recreation, that department’s commissioner, its police department, and the police commissioner) in denying them a permit to demonstrate violated their constitutional rights and for an order requiring defendants to issue a permit.
The Court justified its power to review government restrictions imposed on the exercise of the First Amendment as one that “does not kowtow without question to agency expertise, nor does it dispense justice according to notions of individual expediency ‘like a kadi under a tree’” (quoting Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), and Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)). |
| References | |
| Source Name | Justia |
| Source URL | http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/743/1055/2593670/ |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | New Alliance Party v. Dinkins, 743 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) [Judge Leisure (author)] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; 1st amendment; first amendment |
| Title | Credit Union Cent. Falls v. Groff, 871 A.2d 364 (R.I. 2005): Motion to Intervene Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 2005] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: A particularized interest in an action that might impair or impede an individual’s ability to protect her interest constitutes a live controversy that permits an intervenor right. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Reversed, in a per curiam opinion by Chief Judge Williams, Judges Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The defendant (attorney Louis Groff) represented both Doris Riendeau and the Credit Union Central Falls (CUCF), but both relationships descended into independent lawsuits against the attorney. CUCF (the plaintiff) accused the defendant of misappropriating $224,823. Riendeau asserted that the attorney wrongfully withheld $85,476 in regard to a probate matter, and filed a motion to intervene in the action brought by CUCF. Riendeau’s motion to intervene in the action brought by CUCF was denied, so Riendeau appealed the denial of a motion to intervene in the Superior Court civil action. The appellate court held that the former client did not seek to protect her general economic interest in an eventual recovery.
The opinion cited Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) to emphasize that a court may not address moot orders: “We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency.” |
| References | |
| Source Name | Rhode Island Judiciary |
| Source URL | https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/OpinionsOrders/pdf-files/06-255.pdf |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Credit Union Cent. Falls v. Groff, 871 A.2d 364 (R.I. 2005) [Chief Judge Williams, Judges Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz, motion to intervene; intervenor; mootness |
| Title | Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1997): Justiciability Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1997] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: If there is no longer a justiciable case or controversy, an appeal must be dismissed because it constitutes an improper request for an advisory opinion. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Denying plaintiffs’ appeal and dismissing it for lack of a justiciable controversy, and vacating the Superior Court’s declaratory judgment, in an opinion by Justice Flanders. Justices Weisberger, Lederberg, Bourcier, and Goldberg joined the opinion. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The plaintiffs (four current members and one former member of the nine-person Warwick City Council) appeal from a Superior Court declaratory judgment concerning a dispute involving the city’s municipal budget for the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 1997. The Superior Court rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation of various budgetary provisions contained in the Warwick City Charter and adopted an interpretation favored by the defendant, Lincoln D. Chafee, the Mayor of the City of Warwick. The plaintiff-city council members challenged a declaratory judgment issued by the Superior Court of Kent County in Rhode Island, which rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation of various budgetary provisions contained in the city charter and adopted defendant mayor’s interpretation.
The opinion cited Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) to emphasize that a court may not address moot orders: “We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency.” |
| References | |
| Source Name | Justia |
| Source URL | http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/1997/703-a-2d-748.html |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1997) [Justices Flanders (author), Weisberger, Lederberg, Bourcier, and Goldberg] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; justiciability; mootness; declaratory judgment |
| Title | Konover v. West Hartford, No. 538098, 1996 Conn. Super LEXIS 1097 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996): Property Valuation Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1996] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: A property valuation for tax purposes based on the income approach, a real estate appraisal method that allows investors to estimate the value of a property by taking the net operating income of the rent collected and dividing it by the capitalization rate, by one defendant expert is not sufficiently persuasive. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Reversed, in an opinion by Judge Blue. The Connecticut Superior Court found that the property owner’s expert’s valuation of the property’s worth to be the true and accurate value of the subject property. Therefore, the Superior Court ordered the tax assessor and the town’s board of tax review to correct the assessment against the property owner to conform with that valuation. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | Plaintiff Simon Konover owned a brick office building, which was assessed by the defendant, West Hartford town, for tax purposes. The plaintiff appealed the defendant’s valuation, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-117a, which governs appeals to board of tax review.
In its opinion, the Superior Court refused to consider the question whether the defendant improperly failed to assess the value of an easement on the plaintiff’s property, concluding that the role of the court is to decide cases properly brought to it by appropriate legal procedures, and “not to sit in Solomonic judgment to consider the value of whatever property Konover may happen to own. ‘We do not sit like kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency’ (citing Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)).” |
| References | |
| Source Name | Google Scholar |
| Source URL | https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14202735319761062507 |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Konover v. West Hartford, No. 538098, 1996 Conn. Super LEXIS 1097 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996) [Judge Blue (author)] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadjustiz; tax |
| Title | Turner v. Hand, 24 F. Cas. 355 (D.N.J. 1855): The Will Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1855] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: While testimony about a will’s contents is generally not admissible in court, when there is strong proof that the purported will is a forgery, it is permissible to consider testimonial evidence. |
| Judgment | Judgment: An opinion by Judge Grier entered a verdict in favor of the will, on grounds that the record indicates that the will was genuine, as the mental capacity of the testator was sound. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The validity of the will of Isaac Meeker was questioned, following accusations that the document was forged, or in the alternative, that Meeker was not in a sound state of mind when the will was executed. Five disinterested witnesses testified that they were present when the testator executed his will, that he was of sound mind based on the reasoning he gave for each disposition, and that they corroborated its content based on a reading of the will at the time of execution. With respect to his mental capacity, the testimony was that he was very eccentric, nervous, and excitable and that he was a man of violent passions and prejudices, but that he did well enough tending to his business when he was calm.
Judge Grier invoked the concept of kadijustiz to contrast his restrained and law-abiding common law judgments from what he saw as moralistic and discretion-expanding civil law judgments. According to Judge Grier, “An ecclesiastical court may assume like cadis or sultans to dispose of rights of property on principles of compromise and convenience, without troubling themselves to find out the truth as to a contested instrument. But juries in a common law court exercise no such irresponsible power to dispose of men’s property by such compromises to save themselves trouble of investigation. They are sworn to give a true verdict, a verdict according to law—to say the truth on the issue.” |
| References | |
| Source Name | Justia |
| Source URL | http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-jersey/njdce/2:2008cv05163/221354/187/ |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Turner v. Hand, 24 F. Cas. 355 (D.N.J. 1855) [Judge Grier (author)] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; testator [will = topic or theme, as in wills, trusts, and estates] |
| Title | McManus v. Fulton, 278 P. 126 (Mont. 1929): Stockbroker Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1929] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: Where a party comes to court seeking to enforce a contract contrary to public policy or prohibited by public law, a court may validly to refuse to aid either party. In refusing to enforce such contracts, a court does not act for the benefit or for the preservation of the alleged rights of either party, but in the maintenance of its own laws. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Affirmed, in an opinion by Chief Justice Callaway, joined by Justices Matthews, and Angstman. Justice Galen dissented. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The parties entered into an agreement for the sale of stock with a commission to be given to the stockbroker in either cash or stock. The sale was completed by the stockbroker and plaintiff, Thomas McManus, who elected to take his commission in the form of stock. The defendant and stockholder, the Fulton Oil Company, failed to deliver the stocks to the stockbroker, and the stockbroker brought a breach of contract action against him.
The use of kadijustiz in the opinion in this case signaled that some state court judges see the qāḍī – who historically applied Islamic law in Muslim lands – as a paragon of justice. Here, the opinion cited the “commendable rule of judicial conduct” observed by the “kadi Khalif Omar”: “If today thou seest fit to judge differently than yesterday, do not hesitate to follow the truth as thou seest it; for truth is eternal, and it is better to return to the true than to persist in the false.” The District Court of Toole County decided in favor of the defendant in the breach of contract action. The plaintiff sought review. |
| References | |
| Source Name | CaseText |
| Source URL | https://casetext.com/case/mcmanus-v-fulton |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | McManus v. Fulton, 278 P. 126 (Mont. 1929) [Chief Justice Callaway (author), Justice Matthews, Justice Angstman; Dissenting: Justice Galen] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; stock |
| Title | Judson v. Bee Hive Auto Serv. Co., 297 P. 1050 (Or. 1931): Car Collision Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1931] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: Evidence that a car was rented to a driver, and therefore in his sole possession and control, destroys any inference of agency. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Reversed and dismissed, in an opinion by Justice Belt. Justice Kelly issued a concurring opinion.In the majorityopinion, the Court therefore found no evidence, as used in Or. Const. art. VII, § 3c, to support the jury verdict in this case. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | In a car accident caused by Charles N. Mills, who drove a car owned by the defendant and used it with his knowledge and consent, the question was whether Mills operated the car as an agent or servant of the defendant. The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff, permitting his action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision. The defendant appealed, contending that there was an error in holding that there was evidence to support the verdict.
The use of the notion of kadijustiz in this case signaled that some state court judges see the qāḍī – who historically applied Islamic law in Muslim lands – as a paragon of justice. Here, the opinion cited the “ancient lawgiver[‘s]” willingness to correct errors: “If today thou seest fit to judge differently than yesterday, do not hesitate to follow the truth as thou seest it; for truth is eternal, and it is better to return to the true than to persist in the false.” |
| References | |
| Source Name | |
| Source URL | |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Judson v. Bee Hive Auto Serv. Co., 297 P. 1050 (Or. 1931) [Justice Belt (author); Concurring: Justice Kelly] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; personal injury; agency |
| Title | City of Portland v. Welch, 59 P.2d 228 (Or. 1936): Tax Commission Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1936] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: The Tax Commission Act is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize the county tax commission to eliminate or reduce items in a budget when the city has not gone beyond any constitutional or statutory limitation of indebtedness or taxation. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Affirmed, in an opinion by Justice Belt, joined by Chief Justice Campbell. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The county tax commission, created by the Tax Supervising and Conservation Commission Act, cut the city’s requested budget and subsequently, the county tax assessor refused to extend a tax levy ordinance passed by the city, enacted to cover the shortfall created by the budget cut. The appellee (the city) filed suit, claiming that the Act was unconstitutional in that it abridged their authority as a municipality under the Home Rule Amendments. The trial court agreed, and the tax assessor appealed. The appellant (a county tax accessor) sought review of the decision.
The Court appealed to the concept of kadijustiz, drawing on the image of a qāḍī – who historically applied Islamic law in Muslim lands – as an “ancient lawgiver” to describe how pride of opinion should never deter a court from confession of error. |
| References | |
| Source Name | Justia |
| Source URL | http://law.justia.com/cases/oregon/supreme-court/1961/229-or-308-3.html |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | City of Portland v. Welch, 59 P.2d 228 (Or. 1936) [Justice Belt, C.J. Campbell (author)] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; [constitution, tax = topics and themes] |
| Title | Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975): Schoolyard-Accident Case |
| [Summary Data]
(Upper Fields) |
[Document Type = Contemporary Primary Source]
[Date = 1975] [Reference Type = Case] |
| Holding | Holding: Noncompliance with a statute’s filing deadline will bar an action from suit if strict compliance with statutory requirements is a condition precedent to maintaining an action based on statutory waiver of governmental immunity. Oral notice to any government agents does not satisfy the notice requirement. |
| Judgment | Judgment: Affirmed, in an opinion by Justice Crockett, joined by Chief Justice Henriod and Justices Ellett and Tuckett. Justice Maughan dissented. |
| Facts and Procedural Posture | The plaintiff (a mother) filed a complaint with her son’s school after her son fell on the playground. The mother discussed the accident with the school principal the day it happened, and an accident report was filed with the district. Because the principal told the mother that the power company was responsible for the condition that caused the accident, the mother’s attorney made a demand on the power company. It was not until six months later that the mother learned that the principal had been mistaken, and that the district’s employees had been responsible for the condition. By that time it was too late for her to comply with the filing requirement of § 63-30-13, U.C.A. 1953, which barred claims against a political subdivision unless notice was filed within 90 days after the cause of action arose. The trial court dismissed the action and the mother appealed.
The Court used the image of an “ancient lawgiver” [the language typically used to invoke kadijustiz] to describe how pride of opinion should never deter a court from confession of error. |
| References | |
| Source Name | Justia |
| Source URL | http://law.justia.com/cases/utah/supreme-court/1975/13558-0.html |
| Citation (following Bluebook) | Scarborough v. Granite Sch. Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) [Justices Crockett (author), Henriod (CJ), Ellett, and Tuckett; Dissenting: Justice Maughan] |
| [Metadata]
(Side Fields) |
[Geographic Regions: Select America, North America, United States] |
| Tags | kadijustiz; personal injury; notice, statute of limitations |